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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies how political constitutions influence intergenerational transfers, 
in particular, how veto power affects the determinacy and intertemporal efficiency of 
social security systems. 
Indeterminacy is a property of economies in which finitely lived median voters are 
free to change the decisions of their predecessors at zero resource costo Policymaking 
looks forward in environments of this type: today's decision depends on expectations of 
how tomorrow's median voter will react to the situation she expects to prevail the day 
after tomorrow, and so on ad infinitum. Policy choice is indeterminate because there is no 
way to pin down uniquely either the degree of coordination among successive generations 
of voters or the behavior of the "asymptotic" median voter. 
As a counterpoint to median voter discretion, we propose an environment 
dominated by a fiscal constitution, that is, a framework which restricts the freedom to alter 
policies inherited from the past. In particular, a constitution that gives current voters or 
policymakers sorne veto power over changes in future policies brings to public choices an 
element of precornmitment that helps pin down fiscal policy. Constitutional restrictions 
make future policies easier to predict when one knows past policies. They also deliver 
desirable properties of determinacy and optimality claimed for policy "rules" by Friedman 
(1948, 1968) and by Kydland and Prescott (1977). 
The specific policy question we study is the evolution of pure intergenerational 
social security transfers among finitely-lived households in an infinite economy where 
individual preferences over fiscal transfers are single peaked, and policy conforms to the 
wishes of a well-defined "median voter" household l . Analyzing social security naturally 
sheds light on a number of issues related to other intergenerational resource transfers, 
e.g., public debt, currency, and the generational distribution of the tax burden. As we 
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shall see in later sections, the reasons why societies maintain a social security system stem 
in part from a social compact and, hence, apply with equal force to issues líke defaulting 
on pub líe debt and preserving the purchasing power of currency. 
Here we limit ourselves to social security in an overlapping generations model of 
production in which selfish individuals live two periods and consume one private good. 
Claims on this good are the only asset in the entire economy. We assume away altruistic 
preferences and the provision of public goods -- two key elements in the polítical economy 
of fiscal pOlicy2 -- in order to bring out more c1early the impact of political institutions on 
intergenerational transfers. 
Polítical institutions in this paper define the authority of the government, that is, of 
the median voter, to tax away income. We study two institutional environments that allow 
more and less of this power. The more discretionary of the two political systems we study 
is pure majority voting which permits the larger one of the two homogeneous population 
groups ("young" and "old") in our economy to reduce transfer payments to zero. The 
alternative is a constitution requiring the majority to obtain the approval of the minority to 
any changes in social security taxes and benefits. 
Constitutionallimits to fiscal transfers serve as an endogenous mechanism of 
partial policy cornmitment, one that encourages cooperation among successive median 
voters. Fiscal constitutions with veto power reduce the indeterminacy of allocations which 
occurs under majority voting. In particular, the set of subgame perfect equilibria shrinks 
to monotone, dynamically efficient transfer sequences converging to the golde n rule. Even 
more impressively, veto power shrinks to a unigue point the set of Markov perfect 
eguilibria, and that point turns out to be the golden rule. 
Section 2 describes a production economy whose subgame perfect equilibria we 
analyze in sections 3 and 4 under the majoritarian and constitutional systems. Section 5 
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studies Markov perfect equilibria. We discuss the literature relating to social security 
games and sorne extensions of our main results in sections 6 and 7. 
2. A LINEAR PRODUCTION ECONOMY 
To analyze the allocative effects of different fiscal policy under alternative political 
regimes, we start with a simple economic environment in which the government has a 
socially useful role. The economy is a standard dynamically inefficient overlapping 
generations model with a linear technology: it consists of an infinite number of two period 
lived cohorts. At any point in time only two generations are alive; we call them young 
and oId. Individuals are identical within generations. 
Agents in cohort t = 1,2, ... evaluate consumption bundles (c: 'C:+1) by the 
utility function 
(1) 
where e: represents the consumption at time t of the generation born at time t (the 
young), and C:+1 is the consumption at time t+ 1 of the same generation (the old). The 
utiIity function is concave, twice differentiable and additively separable with P > O . 
Capital depreciates fully each period, and the production function is linear in labor and 
capital: F( K1 , L1 ) = LI + R· KI with R> O. The marginal product of capital equals R, and 
that of labor equals one. Agents supply labor inelastically. They are endowed with a non-
negative vector (&1' & 2) of efficiency labor units in youth and in old age. Population grows 
at arate n > O. There is no fiat money or public debt in this economy. 
We as sume that a competitive equilibrium without social security displays positive 
aggregate saving and dynamic inefficiency. Taken together, these two assumptions mean 
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(2) 
The institution of social security in this economy aHows the government to transfer 
resources into the future more efficientIy then the accumulation of private capital. For 
instance, the associated "laissez-faire" lifecyc1e utility of a typical generation t = 1,2, ... is 
(3) 
the indirect utility achieved when the interest rate is R and the present value of lifecyc1e 
. . c2 mcome IS c I +-R 
A social planner may easily achieve a higher level of lifecyc1e utility for aH 
generations t = 0,1,... by adopting the superior social security technology. One example 
is a stationary reallocation that levies on each person a lump sum tax r E [O, r g], where 
r g is the golden-rule transfer, and distributes the proceeds equally among the older 
generation. The resulting utility, 
(4) v={u(c l -r)+P.u(c2 +(l+n).r) U(c2 +(l+n).r) 
if t ~ 1 
ift = O 
is higher than v' because 1 +n> R. Recall that r g maximizes the RHS of the top line of 
equation 4 and provides the typical generation with the golden-rule utility v g • 
3. FISCAL POLICY UNDER MAJORITY VOTING 
Many policy decisions in democracies require approval by a simple majority, that is, 
by 50 % plus one vote in a chamber of deputies representing the electoral body. In 
practice, the will of an electoral majority may be thwarted by non-proportional representa-
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tion, veto power from the executive or judiciary branches of government, or by voting 
blocks advancing the interests of particular groups. Still majoritarian systems are both 
descriptive and analytically tractable; for simple cases in which voters' preferences over 
policies outcomes are single peaked, the Median Voter Theorem enables us to aggregate 
individual tastes and obtain as an equilibrium of the voting process the outcome most 
preferred by a well defined agent -- the median voter. 
Our analysis of majority voting over social security is in the spirit of Hammond (1975). 
We postulate a pay-as-you-go transfer system with no commitment technology: there is a 
vote every period which determines the social security tax l' t levied on each young 
household, as well as the benefit (1 + nh t paid out to each old household. The current 
median voter in this arrangement cannot compel future voters to pay tax l' t for any s> t. 
To reflect electoral realities and provide sorne incentives toward intergenerational 
cooperation, we as sume that the median voter belongs in the young generation3• 
The set Y of feasible fiscal policies contains all tax/transfer schemes that ensure 
consumption by the young is non-negative, 
(5) 
and the median voter in generation t maximizes 
(6) 
subject to (5) and given the strategy followed by the median voter of the succeeding cohort 
t+ 1. 
3.1 Open-Loop Equilibrium 
A convenient benchmark to start with is open-Ioop strategies that depend purely on 
calendar time and not at all on historl. These strategies are independent of the actions of 
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preceding players, both in and out of equilibrium, and hence provide no incentives for 
cooperation among generations. Harnmond (1975) and Sjoblom (1985), in fact, 
recognized that the open loop outcome is zero social security; Loewy (1988) also found 
that the open loop equilibrium of a monetary economy shrinks to zero the purchasing 
power of currency. Therefore, in open loop equilibria the social security technology is not 
used, and agents obtain the "laissez-faire" lifecycle utility. 
3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria 
If selfish median voters are who behave in the apparently cooperative fashion that 
sustains a social security system, they do so from the vantage point of enlightened self-
interest, that is, because each cohort is individualIy better off with a social security system 
in place than without one. Incentives to coordinate fiscal policies over cohorts of median 
voters may be thought of as social compacts or "norms" enforced by a system of rewards 
and punishments. 
Here is an example of how reinforcement works. Cohorts that transfer to the old 
the resources specified by the norm expect to receive in their own old age a normal 
payment; cohorts that defect from the norm in their youth expect to receive a zero transfer 
in old age. Social norms in this example are enforced by a sequence of trigger strategies 
that connect the decisions of median voters with the behavior of their predecessors. As we 
know from Kandori (1992) and Salant (1991), these strategies make cooperation 
individualIy rational when it is unfeasible to cornmit to a future policy course. 
Simple majoritarian systems tum out to sustain any individualIy rational alIocation 
as a subgame perfect equilibrium by the use of an appropriate trigger strategy profile. 
This folk-like result, conjectured in Harnmond (1975), has the following formal statement: 
Proposition 1 (Majoritarian Folk Theorem): For every feasible profile (v;) ~ of 
lifecycle utilities bounded below by the "laissez faire", or open-loop, equilibrium 
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utility level v', there exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
majoritarian social security game that starts at t and pays off v; ~ v' for aH s> t. 
To see this consider the foHowing strategy profile ( " ) ~ for the median voter, consistent 
with payoffs (v;) ~ : 
(7) {< , = I O i = 1, .. ,1 otherwise 
We will show that there are no gains from deviating from the aboye strategies, that is, no 
median voter will be the first to deviate from the optimal policy " ; and it is incentive 
compatible to punish all defectors. 
The payoff from deviating is the "laissez faire" equilibrium utility level v'; while the 
payoff from the strategy " is v' which exceeds v' by construction. Hence, " is 
incentive compatible. Furthermore, the utility of punishing a defector is still the ·"laissez 
faire" equilibrium level v' which exceeds the utility from not punishing because 
Fiscal policies5 sustaining subgame perfect equilibria under majority voting are 
ones that make each cohort prefer intergenerational cooperation to the open-loop outcome. 
In particular, we have the following: 
Proposition 2 (Characterization Theorem): There is a continuous, increasing, convex 
function ifJ: y ~ y and a maximum sustainable tax 'lila, such that the set of 
feasible, individual rational fiscal policy ( ':) ~ satisfies 
if R ~ MRS(EI - ,:,E2 + <+1(1 + n)) 
if R < MRS( El - ,:,E2 + ':+1{1 + n)) 
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(ii) ': E[o"//Iuxl 
Proof of Proposition 2: Define the functionq;: Y ~ Y from 
u( &1 - r:) + p. U(&2 + (1 + n). r :+1) = v'. Part (i) of this proposition is derived from individual 
rationality. Moreover, it implies that ':+1 is an increasing and quasi-concave function of 
': with q; (& 1) ~ & 1 . Thus, it exists another fixed point of the function defined in part (i), 
,= '//la,· Q.E.D. 
As shown in Figure 1, the map defined by part (i) of proposition 2, which 
connects today's social security tax with the lowest incentive compatible tax for tomorrow, 
has two fixed points. These are the zero transfer, and a higher value, 'I/UH' aboye which 
individualIy rational transfers explode and youthful consumption becomes negative in 
finite time. Figure 2 displays the corresponding equilibrium alIocations. 
3.3 Indeterminacy of Majoritarian Equilibria 
Any feasible social security sequence ( '.\) ~ that satisfies the inequalities (i) and 
(ii) listed in Proposition 2 is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the majority voting system. 
Figures 1 and 2 display alI these sequences both directly and also in terms of the old-age 
consumption that corresponds to each one. SpecificalIy, the set of equilibria contains: 
(i) a continuum of constant sequences 't t = 't E Y = [O, 't max] 'v't; 
(ii) dynamicalIy inefficient sequences bounded aboye by the golden rule, e.g., 
sequences that satisfy " ~ , g - r for sorne r > ° and 'v't ; 
(iii) volatile, cyclical and chao tic sequences generated by the tentlike map drawn in 
Figure 3. 
Note al so in Figures 1 and 2 that subgame perfect equilibria exist that pay off every 
cohort, except the initial old, more than the golden rule utility leve!. These are associated 
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with the superior social security technology, at " = 'g' and with zero capital 
accurnulation. This bonanza is rnade possible by "inventing" social security in sorne finite 
period with an initial benefit below the golden rule value 'g . The resulting surplus rnay 
then be spread arnong aH subsequent cohorts by a rising sequence of benefits which 
converges to 't g (1 + n) . 
The large arnount of indeterrninacy present in Figures l and 2 sterns directly frorn 
the inability of voters to cornmit their successors to a particular cOurse of fiscal policy. 
Section 4 and 5 explore how refinernents in political institutions bring about drastic 
changes in both the size and the volatility of fiscal policies. 
4. CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Large policy adjustments in a democratic society often require wider approval than 
that of a simple 1egislative majority. This observation applies particularly when: (i) there 
is uncertainty over the identity or preferences of future policymakers; and also when (ii) 
the policy change under consideration contains the seeds of its own reversal because it 
affects adversely the interests of, and wi11likely draw loud objection from, a politically 
significant group. 
Case (i) is similar to the one examined in Tabellini and Alesina (1990) where 
today's median voter does not know for sure the tastes of his successor over public goods. 
To perpetuate his own favorite bundle of public goods, today's median voter runs a large 
deficit which reduces the resources available to his successor. 
In what foHows we ignore aH future uncertainty and focus on case (ii). 
SpecificaHy, we consider a political arrangement that partIy precornmits fiscal policy by 
awarding the current median voter veto power over future policy changes. Veto power is 
exercised through a Constitution, assurned to be fixed and irnmutable for the time being; 
we discuss in Section 6 how this arrangement may come about. The Constitution 
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empowers the younger cohort at time t to set up a binary fiscal policy agenda Tt ' and 
entrusts the old with choosing from the agenda the actual policy '1 to be implemented this 
periodo 
Formally, we have 
(8) 
where '1-1 is last period I s actual policy and PI E [0,6" 1] is the new social security tax 
level proposed by the young. The status quo fiscal policy '1_1 plays the role of a state 
variable here and makes all the difference between the constitutional political structure and 
the majoritarian one. 
Constitutionalism in this setting encourages cornmitment. The old can guarantee 
themselves the same social security as their irnmediate predecessors by vetoing any change 
PI "* '1-1. The young, too, can ensure a constant fiscal policy sequence by choosing 
PI = '1-1' i.e., with an offer to maintain the status quo ante. 
We as sume that the economy starts off in autarky, without a social security 
system, and the initial agenda in period one is TI = {O, PI}' PI ~ ° . 
Old generations have a simple decision: they pick the largest item on the agenda because 
their utility is mono tone in the size of the transfer. The old would clearly choose to 
exercise their power to veto any reduction in social security; hence transfer sequences will 
be non-decreasing. 
Agenda setting by the younger cohort6 guarantees them the golden rule payoff vg• 
This is easiest to see when the social security system is invented; starting from autarky at 
t = 1, any young cohort can get a unanimous vote to raise the social security transfer 
level from zero to the golden rule value (1 + nh g , and veto any fiscal changes in the 
subsequent period t = 2. In the Appendix we show that any young generation that wishes 
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to alter inherited fiscal policy can guarantee itself the golden rule payoff which is simply 
the utility of defecting from the equilibrium path. 
Given the defection payoff, it is now straightforward to prove the following 
constitutional analogs of Propositions 1 and 2. The proofs are in the Appendix. 
Proposition 3 (Constitution Folk Theorem): For every feasible profile (v.:) ~ of lifecycle 
utilities whose lower bound is the golde n rule level v g' there exists a subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium of the constitutional social security game that starts at t 
with zero social security and pays off v;:;::: v g for all s> t. 
Fiscal policies that support these payoffs are described in 
Proposition 4 (Characterization Theorem): There is a continuous, increasing, convex 
function If/: y ~ y and a maximum sustainable tax '[ g such that the set of 
feasible, individual rational fiscal policy ( '[:) ~ satisfies 
where x is uniquely defined from v( R'&J + &2; x) = v' 
Recall that v( R, &J + &2; x) ís the indirect utility as a function of the interest rate and 




with the equal sign holding. The function IJI-- interpreted again as a map between today's 
actual tax and tomorrow's minimum incentive compatible tax -- has only one fixed point 
this time, just T g • as Figures 4 and 5 show. 
Since no stationary allocation can pay more than the golden rule, one consequence 
of the individual rationality constraint in eq.(9), is the following 
Corollary: The golde n rule is the unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Of course, it is possible for non-stationary equilibria to pay off more than the 
golden rule utility because an initial old generation received less. However, the distance 
of any non-stationary equilibrium from the golden rule must asymptotically shrink to zero 
because it would take an explosive sequence of transfers to keep welfare boundeq away 
from the golden rule payoff. In fact, one easily demonstrates the following result. 
Proposition 5: AH constitutional equilibria support aHocations that converge to the golden 
rule. 
The proof is straightforward: the tax sequence (r:) is bounded and weakly increasing by 
definition. It converges to the golden rule valueT g because it would be individually 
irrational for T; to rema in bounded aboye by a number less than T g , and infeasible to 
remain bounded below by a number bigger than T g' The irrationality is simple to show; 
if T; < T g , then equation (9) tells us that a proposal to raise the social security tax to T g 
irnmediately, and to veto subsequent changes would receive the unanimous approval of all 
currently existing generations. The infeasibility of maintaining T; sorne distance aboye 
T g forever comes again from Part (i) of Proposition 4 which requires transfer payments to 
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• increase fas ter than the rate of growth n if T, > T g • 
The main insight from this section is to look at Propositions 3 and 4 joint1y and 
conc1ude that a constitutional grant of veto power to the minority is sufficient to eliminate 
aH volatility and aH dynamic inefficiency from majoritarian subgame perfect equilibria. 
Figure 4 shows how much the policy cornmitment emanating from this power shrinks the 
set of equilibrium allocations. On1y one steady state survives; aH cyc1ical, chaotic and 
dynamicaHy inefficient equilibria disappear. 
5. MARKOVIAN FISCAL POLICIES 
One way to restrict fiscal policy is to regard it as a stable function of sorne state 
variable and not as a sequence which depends on calendar time. Krusell, Quadrini and 
Ríos-Rull (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1995) and other authors study Markovian 
policies for which the stock of physical capital is the relevant state variable. These policies 
restrict economies with different histories but identical structure and capital stock to adopt 
the same fiscal policy. 
In this section we impose this restriction on intergenerational transfer decisions and 
show how it reduces the indeterminacy of equilibrium allocations by one degree. 
However, not aH of the resulting equilibrium transfer sequences need be efficient. 
y oung individual s take as given the tax sequence and choose savings to solve the 
following economic optimizatíon problem: 
(10) s. t. 
C, ~ &1 - T, - s, 
C'+I ~ &2 + (1 + n }r'+1 + Rs, 
Moreover, the median voter in each young cohort has to determine the level of 
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intergenerational transfer to be awarded to the old generation. We restrict the choice of the 
median voter to stationary, or Markovian, policy functions of the following type: 
(11) 
Thus, the median voter' s optimal decision can be obtained by maximizing her 
lifecycle utility with respect to the function e, (k,) , subject to the accumulation relation 
s, = (1 + n )kl+l which equates net private wealth to the aggregate capital stock. 
The first order condition for the median voter's maximization problem is 
(12) 
The first term, R, is the marginal cost of increasing today's tax rate, whereas the second 
term represents the marginal benefit, which comes from the increase in e, on tomorrow's 
capital stock. The saving function can be written in terms of lifecycle after-tax 
It follows that 
(13) (1 ) okt+1 _ ZI + n -- - - ----'---
oet 1-z . oet+1 
2 
okt+1 
where, for i = 1,2, .. , z¡ represents the derivative of the saving function with respect to the 
period-i net endowment. Substituting (13) into (12) and rearranging terms we obtain the 
differential equation 
(14) oet+1 = R 
o kt+1 ZI - RZ2 
Integrating we obtain, 
(15) 
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The constant of integration, A, is a free parameter which is pinned down by the 
first median voter's expectations of future policies. Notice also that, for the period-t 
median voter, the political optimization problem turns out not to depend on the function 
(), as long as the next median voter also chooses the fiscal policy according to equation 
(15f. 
In order to simplify the analysis, we as sume that the utility function display s 
constant elasticity of substitution: U(c,) = c,I-J. /(1- A) for A -:f:. 1. It is easy to show that 
equation (15) then simplifies to: 
(16) 
Combining this policy function with the saving function implied by a CES utility function 
and the accumulation relation, we derive the following law of motion for the stock of 
capital: 
(17) { 
&1 - A &2 + A(l + n) R } 
k'+1 = Max 0,--- ( ) {o )11,1. +-k, l+n l+n·~R l+n 
subject to kt+1 ~ A \:jI. 
R 
The capital accumulation dynamics depend on the median voter's expectations 
through the free parameter A. The capital stock converges to its steady state value 
(18) { 
&1 - A &2 + A(l + n) } 
kss =Max 0, -( ) {o )1/,1. . l+n-R l+n-R ·~R 
( tJ. 
In particular, there are two possible cases. Let us define byA* = ~RtJ. &( -&2 the value 
'R +l+n 
of the free parameter that sets to zero the intercept of the law of motion from equation 
(17). If A < A * , then the economy converges to a steady state associated with a positive 
capital stock, as figure 6a shows. If A ~ A* , on the other hand, the economy converges to 
a zero capital stock steady state along the path shown in figure 6b or 6c. The restriction 
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k'+1 :s;~ in (17) guarantees that the social security tax rate is non-negative. 
The evolution of capital has its mirror image in the dynamics of equilibrium tax 
rates. In fact, using the Markovian policy function in equation (11), and the law of motion 
for the stock of capital in equation (17), wecan write the law of motion of the equilibrium 
tax rate as follows: 
(19) . { (fJRt1. +R R (fJRt1. &1 -&2 R } el+l = Mm A, {{} )1/1. A - -- ( )1/1. + --e, . 
vJR 1 + n fJR 1 + n 
Here again, depending on the median voter's expectations through the parameter A, we 
( ) 1/,1. ( )1/1. . . R fJR & - & R fJR + 1 + n • have three posslble cases. We defme A'= 1/./ 2 = 1/1. A to be 
1 + n (fJR) '+ R 1 + n (fJR) + R 
the value that sets to zero the intercept of equation (19). If A> A· > A' , then the 
equilibrium social security tax rate sequence is monotonically increasing to its maximum 
value, e = A, as figure 7a shows. If A> A' and A < A· , then the sequence converges to its 
steady state value 
(20) 1 (fl'D)I/J. R R (p'D)" 1. e .. = + n 1\ + A _ 1\ &1 - &2 < A s.~ 1 + n - R (fJR t 1. 1 + 11 - R (PR t A 
as in figure 7b. The last case corresponds to A < A· < A'; here the tax rate monotonically 
decreases to zero, as shown in figure 7c, and resources are transferred into the future 
exclusively by accumulating physical capital. 
The parallel between capital accumulation and equilibrium tax dynamics is 
straightforward. Equilibria with a positive level of capital are clearly inefficient as agents 
do not fully exploit the superior social security technology. Indeed, even zero capital 
equilibria might be inefficient as long as the social security tax rate is lower than the 
golden rule level. In fact, efficient allocations are obtained for zero capital and () = A ~ r g • 
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To surnmarize, for a given initiallevel of capital stock, the set of equilibrium 
social security tax rates associated with a stationary or Markovian policy function 
contains: 
• a continuum of decreasing sequences (indexed by the parameter A) converging 
to a steady state with zero social security and positive capital; 
• a continuum of monotonically increasing or decreasing sequences (again 
indexed by A) converging to the steady state level ()ss defined in equation 
(20), and to a positive capital stock; 
• a continuum of monotonically increasing sequences converging to a steady state 
tax rate level A, and a zero capital stock; and 
• an increasing sequence converging to the golden rule transfer 
(21) 
The adoption of stationary or Markovian policy funetions deereases the intrinsic 
indeterminacy of these intergenerational transfer schemes to a one dimensional 
indeterminaey. The long run dynamics of the system are indexed on the median voters' 
expectations through the parameter A, which also determines the efficiency properties of 
the equilibrium allocations. 
One way to allow the median voter to form her expectations about future policy is 
to introduce sorne degree of cornmitment, along the lines suggested in the previous 
seetion. Specifical1y, if we restriet the deeision spaee of the voters by introdueing veto 
power8, the free parameter A is pinned down. In this setting, the expectation parameter A 
equals the extreme right-hand side of equation (21), and the economy converges to golden 
rule with zero capital and a social security tax rate equal to A. 
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6. RELATED LITERATURE 
Social security has a similar role to public debt in reallocating consumption among 
successive population cohorts. Like public debt and fiat money, social security is a 
"social contrivance" whose value as a transfer payment mechanism depends on mutual 
trust among cohorts and on sorne degree of intergenerational cooperation. In plain 
language, social security is like a bubble, and it would be useful to relate the social 
security equilibria we studied in Sections 2 and 3 with the dynamics of public debt and fiat 
money we have learned from Wallace (1980), Tirole (1985) and others9 • The connection is 
easiest to establish in situations of zero primary budget deficits. Consider, for example, 
an "actuarially fair" tax sequence (,,) such that 
(22) l+n 




This sequence adds zero present value to each generation I s lifecycle income 
computed at interest rates that correspond to marginal rates of substitution at the 
consumption vector e' = (81 - ,,82 + (1 + n)',+I) implied by the sequence (,,). Each 
element of this sequence represents excess supply by a typical member of generation t as 
well as 1/(1 +n) times the excess demand by each member of generation t-l. Equations 
(22) and (23), taken together, describe the reflected offer curve of a generation-t 
household. 
Figure 8 reminds us that this curve coincides with the phase diagram of 
equilibrium in pure-exchange economies with a given stock of fiat money or public debt. 
All we need to reinterpret actuarially fa ir social security as public debt or currency is to 
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think of T, as the real per capita value of the government liability, and of eq. (22) as the 
government budget constraint in an economy with zero public consumption and zero 
primary budget deficit. Then it is easy to see that the golde n rule outcome is the only 
stationary actuarialIy fair equilibrium, and one that is likely to prevail under a credible 
constitutional arrangement which cornmits to maintaining the purchasing power of social 
contrivances -- or bubbles -- like currency, public debt or social security. 
By the same token, the indeterminacy of equilibrium we encounter in economies 
with bubbles is directly related to the absence of a credible promise from the Treasury or 
the Central Bank to preserve the future value of the bubble. Another source of 
indeterminacy creeps in if, in addition, we permit governments or median voters to deviate 
from the "fairness" of the present value relation (22) by running a primary budget deficit 
of their choosing. Then majoritarian equilibria will display the two degrees of 
indeterminacy exhibited by the subgame perfect allocations of Figures 1 or 2. 
Reducing the large set of subgame perfect equilibria has been a priority in the 
fiscal policy literature ever since Harnmond (1975); it is typically achieved by ruling out 
trigger strategies. Kotlikoff, Persson and Svensson (1988) and Esteban and Sakovics 
(1993) restrict the strategy sets of the median voter to costly Markovian strategies of the 
form TI+1 = rjJ( T,) which assign a fixed resource cost k > O to any change in the social 
security tax. The resource cost is a form of partial cornmitment. For economies starting 
with zero transfers, the non-cooperative pure-strategy outcome in the case of "small" k is 
to reach a transfer somewhat short of the golde n rule and to remain there forever. 
More eclectic equilibrium refinements include Boldrin and Rustichini (1995), who 
assign the entire surplus from inventing social security to the generation that actualIy 
invents the system. Cooley and Soares (1995) study majoritarian stationary equilibria in a 
calibrated pure exchange economy with four-period lived households, focusing on the tax 
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rate preferred by the second youngest generation; it is this generation which closely 
corresponds to the age profile of the median U.S. voter. 
7. HETEROGENEOUS VOTERS AND OTHER EXTENSIONS 
We discuss here the robustness of the conclusion reached earlier about the 
operating characteristics and the social desirability of constitutional rules for fiscal policy. 
First of aH, it is fairly straightforward to see under what circumstances our basic 
results extend to economies which may wish to redistribute income from richer to poorer 
individuals. How will intragenerational transfers to the poor interfere with, or influence, 
intergenerational transfers to the old? The answer is typicaHy "not at all" if society 
possesses two independent instruments for these two redistributive targets; but social 
security allocations may well respond to changes in income distribution if the social 
security structure is progressive in taxes or transfers. 
To see this in a particular simple case, we emulate Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
indexing households by the amount e E [O,e'] of efficiency labor units supplied in youth. 
Suppose that each individual type is public knowledge and that types are distributed 
according to a cumulative function H such that 
(24) H(O) = 0, H(e) = 1 Ve? e' 
Aggregate supply of efficiency labor per unit population continues 10 equal one, e.g., 
(25) JedH = 1 
A fiscal policy is now a triple (TI' PI' SI) for each period, consisting of a proportional tax 
rate TI E [0,1] , a per capita subsidy to the young PI ~ O, and a proportional social 
security transfer eSI to retirees of type e . The parameter PI control s the distribution of 
income within generation t while SI regulates how resources are shared between 
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generations t -1 and t. 
Among individuals alive at time t only the poorer within generation t would favor 
a positive lump-sum intragenerational transfer payment p, . Richer members of the same 
generation will be against this transfer scheme because they are net contributors to it. 
Older folk, who care only about social security pensions, may also be opposed to the 
extent that intragenerational transfers subtract tax revenue away from pensions. In fact, 
voters will reject welfare payments to the poor whenever the fraction of people with 
below-median income is not too large. In the Appendix we prove the following result: 
Proposition 6: If H(l) < 2 + n ,any fiscal policy (T, ,p, ,s,) with p, ;::: ° is defeated in 
2+2n 
a pairwise majority vote by another ( T, ,0, s, + 5) for sorne small 5> O. 
This result implies that, unless the distribution of income is extremely skewed toward the 
left tail, dynamically inefficient economies will vote for purely intergenerational transfers. 
Another issue is to endogenize the voting structure, permitting the electorate 10 
choose a majoritarian or constitutional fiscal structure, and to switch from one to the other 
according to well-specified rules. Fiscal structures may be thought of as the outcomes of 
an enlarged game in which the young propose both the choice of institutional arrangement 
(majoritarian or constitutional) and the level of the transfer. The rules of this game require 
that, if society is organized along constitutional lines, the consent of the old must be 
obtained prior to any change, e.g., before either a change in the transfer level or a switch 
from the constitutional to a majoritarian system. A simple majority suffices for all other 
decisions. Proposition 4 is likely to generalize in this setting, that is, weakly increasing 
transfer sequences converging to the gold rule continue to be equilibria of the "grand" 
constitutional game. Starting with a majoritarian system and zero transfers, the median 
voter can guarantee herself the golden rule utility by switching to a constitution and 
22 
opposing aH future changes; the rest of the argument proceeds exact1y like Proposition 4. 
A third problem is the inflexibility of constitutional fiscal structures. Imagine, in 
particular, that voters set the tax at a numerical level independent of any realizations of the 
income and other parameters of the economy. An instructive example of this phenomenon 
is to endow the young with a binary stochastic income stream. 
(26) {
a with probability p 
s¡ = P> a with probability 1- p 
We keep old-age labor endowment constant at&2 as before, and assume that voting takes 
place each period after endowment realizations. Hence the first young generation that 
experiences the high income realization, p, will obtain constitutional approval for raising 
the transfer level to the golden rule of the economy with deterministic income vector 
(p, & 2)' In later periods, old voters in this economy will resist any proposal to lower the 
transfer to the level implied by the golden rule of the economy with the smaller 
deterministic income vector (a, &2)' even if a happens to be the income of the actual tax-
paying generation. It is, in this sense that constitutions or veto power may lead to 
"excessive" social security. Similar arguments can be made about random changes in 
population parameters. 
We conclude with a cornment on the robustness of Proposition 4. Are 
constitutionaHy set social security transfers likely to go up over time if changes in the 
system require an elevated majority of voters rather than complete unanimity? This 
situation may be explored in a model with more than two coexisting generations like 
Cooley and Soares (1995). In particular, would a coalition of say, 1/4 or more of all 
voters attempt to block a proposal to reduce permanently social security taxes or benefits 
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by 8 > O? The answer depends on the demographic and income structure of the economy 
and on several other things, but it appears to us to be in the affirmative. This proposal 
will surely be opposed by all retirees and all persons sufficientIy near retirement because it 
reduces the present value of their remaining lifetime incomes. The cutoff age depends on 
the prevailing rate of interest, but assuming this age to be about 53 years, opposition 
against a reduction in social security will unite 20 or more cohorts in the 56-75 age group, 
with 30 cohorts in the 21-50 age group (including the median voting cohort) being in favor 
of reform, and the 51 to 55 year olds standing on the margino If this opposition group has 
veto power, Proposition 4 will extend to economies with richer demographies than the one 
we have studied here. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX 




.f{either 1"/+_}_1 = 1";+}_1 
or 1"1+}_1 - O 
'íf i = 1, .. . ,2n and n = 1,2, .. 
otherwise 
We will show that there are no gains from deviating from the above strategy, that is, no 
median voter will be the first to deviate from the optimal policy r'; and it is incentive 
compatible to punish all defectors. 
The payoff from deviating is the "laissez faire" equilibrium utility level v', while the 
payoff from the strategy r' is v' which exceeds v' by construction. Hence, r' is 
incentive compatible. In addition, the utility of punishing a defector, 
v(R, &1 + [&2 + (1 + n). <+ }+I]/ R) clearly exceeds that of not punishing, 
Proof of Proposition 2: Define the function tP: y ~ y from 
(A-2) 
and note that individual rationality implies part (i) of this Proposition. The definition of tP 
implies that it is increasing and concave with ~(EI) > El which implies that tP has another 
fixed point, r = r /llar' in the interval ("C g , El) . 
Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4: We show first that the utility of defecting here equals the 
golde n rule payoff v g. Payoffs are v' = v(R, &1 - 1";+} + [&2 + (1 + n). <+ }+I]/ R) if a 
generation-t voter maintains the transfer policy (r;+) , r;+ }+I)' and 
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VID = m'PC v(R,GI -T + [&2 + (1 + n). r]1 R) if she defects by changing upward the sequence 
T~Tt-I 
and blocking all subsequent attempts to alter the new sequence. The utility of defection is 
clearly 
(A-3) 
But setting r :_1 > r g cannot be part of any individually rational sequence (r:) starting from 
r' = O for that sequence would have to cross the golden rule transfer r g; this means the 
existence of a subsequence (T:) such that Tk_1 < T g' Tk > r g' To maintain individual 
rationality, this subsequence would have to pay off at least v g to any median voter in it, 
which requires its elements to increase rapidly past, g and diverge. 
The remainder of the proofs is directly analogous to that of Propositions 1 and 2, 
except for the veto power awarded to the old which simply implies that any subgame 
perfect equilibrium sequence (,,) must be weakly increasing. 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
The fiscal policy 1í, = ( " ,p, ,s,) satisfies the public sector budget constraint 
(A-4) T, = p, + s, /l + n 
and implies a lifecycle net income vector ((1- " )e+ p"es,+I) for an individual of type e. 
The corresponding lifecycle consumption vector is 
(A-S) ((1-" )e+ p, -z,(e),Rz,(e)+esl+d 
where z,(e) ~ O is saving by type e household. 
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Payoffs from the policy ffl = ('1 ,PI ,SI) are 
for old people 
(A-6) 
v/,(e,nJ={ R,(I-lJe+ PI + S~J) foryoungpeople 
Rere v is an indirect utility function which depends on the interest rate and on the present 
value of lifecyc1e income. 
Older people evaluate 7t t by its social security component alone, while young 
people care about the present value of net transfers, 
(A-7) 
Suppose also that young people expect that St+1 does not depend in any way on the 
transfer payment Pt but may depend in a weakly positive manner on the variable St • 
For any policy ff l = ('1 ,PI ,SI) satisfying (A-4) consider the alternative policy 
ff l '= (SI + o ,O,SI + o) for sorne ó > O. This one satisfies (A-4), raises the social security l+n 
rate by ó > O and abolishes altogether the intragenerationallump-sum subsidy Pt . Clearly 
all old people prefer ff l ' to 7t t for any ó > O; and young people also do provided that 
v!'(e,ff / ) - v{(e,ffl ,) = (l-e)pl + eo .(_1_ -~) :s; ° which occurs for all e> 1 and ó > O. The l+n R 






I Ferejohn (1986) analyzes sorne of the pitfalls in the median voter equilibrium concept. 
2 This issues are investigated in Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Tabellini (1991). 
3 The median voter in postwar U.S. presidential elections is a net saber whose age varies 
between 43 and 46 years. This descriptions corresponds to a member of the "young" 
generation in a two-cohort economy, and of sorne intermediate generation in a multi-
cohort framework like Cooley and Soares (1995). The alternative assumption of an old-
gene ratio n median voter underlies Loewy' s (1989) analysis of open-Ioop government 
fiscal policies. 
4 Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 130-34, discuss open-Ioop strategies. 
5The trigger strategy proposed above does not support renegotiation proof equilibria. In 
fact, ifthe social security system has been dismantled to punish a deviator, all future 
generations will prefer to reinstitute the system. A renegotiation proof strategy that supports 
the same set of equilibria is presented in the appendix. It requires the punishment of odd-
numbered (first, third, etc.) successive defectors, in order to deter unprovoked deviations. 
The proof is completed by showing that no median voter will be the first to defect from the 
equilibrium policy L, and that the best response to defection is immediate punishment by 
the next median voter. 
6 If the old generation were to set the agenda, the game would have no equilibrium in pure 
strategy as the young would refuse to transfer resources to the old, preferring instead to 
start a social security system when they become old. 
7 Therefore we as sume that every median voter decides according to equation 15, lagged 
one period, in order to validate the previous median voter expectations. 
8 In this case the veto power should be interpreted as contingent on the capital level, and 
therefore it could only be applied to the parameter A. In other words, the veto power 
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could be used only if the reduction in the social security tax rate takes place for a given 
capital stock. 
9 See Azariadis (1993), Chs. 19 and 24, for a modern treatment of bubble dynamics in_ 
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